

# Just Transition: Elements and considerations for Emissions Trading Systems


**PMIF Global Knowledge Forum 2022**

*Stefano De Clara*  
*Head of Secretariat, ICAP*  
*5 July 2022*

# About the International Carbon Action Partnership

An international **forum** of **40 national & subnational** governments to **exchange** knowledge and experiences on emissions trading systems (**ETS**)

- Share **best practice** & learn from each others' experiences
- Facilitate **linking** of carbon markets
- Explore the **role** of carbon pricing in climate policy






International Carbon  
Action Partnership

# ~~Emissions Trading Systems~~ Carbon Pricing and Just Transition

# ETS worldwide


## Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)

- Connecticut
- Delaware
- Maine
- Maryland
- Massachusetts
- New Hampshire
- New Jersey
- New York
- Rhode Island
- Vermont
- Virginia



- 25  In force
- 7  Under development
- 15  Under consideration

## Groups affected by carbon pricing



Source: adelphi

## ETS effects on households

- ETS entities pass on carbon cost to consumers -> rising prices for energy (and depending on ETS coverage, fuel)



Effect of higher prices proportional to income

**Regressive** ← → **Progressive**

Poorer households pay proportionally more than wealthier ones


Poorer households pay proportionately less than wealthier ones

- Depending on policy design and local circumstances, **ETS/carbon pricing can be progressive or regressive**

Source: adelphi

## ETS effects on workers

- The desired low-carbon transition through carbon pricing and ETS – as other climate policy – will entail job losses, but also new job profiles and new jobs being created
- Relatively biggest job losses expected for coal mining and refineries (often locally concentrated + many low-skilled, older workers)
- Generally: studies point to net-job-gains (quantitatively + qualitatively) from transition to low-carbon economy
- Carbon revenues can be used for investing in green growth and green industries – but challenge extends beyond the realm of climate policy



Source: adelphi

## ETS effect on local communities

- Flexibility of pricing instruments vs. 'pollution hot spots' with a high concentration of poor/disadvantaged groups
- Offset programs can amplify these effects
- Entry points:
  - Revenue use
  - Direct regulation complementing CO2 price
  - Limiting offset use



*Source: adelphi*



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# **Design considerations for ETS and Just Transition**

## JT elements for ETS: cap setting

How far and how fast should emissions be reduced?




- Align with national **climate objectives**
- Expectation of mitigation vs. costs: no harm to national **competitiveness** and welfare
- Distribution of **mitigation effort** between sectors inside and outside the ETS


## JT elements for ETS: scope and coverage

Defining the scope and coverage of an ETS involves determining:

- **Sectors** to be included
- **Greenhouse** gases to be included
- **Point of Regulation** (upstream or downstream)
- **Size** of facilities and companies (e.g., by capacity or emissions threshold)



# JT elements for ETS: Sectoral coverage



*Most systems cover emissions from power and industry*

*The sectoral coverage of several ETSs expands to other sectors as well*


*The share of emissions covered and the point of regulation (upstream vs downstream) varies significantly across systems*

\* Coverage numbers reflect CO<sub>2</sub> emissions only

# JT elements for ETS: Allocation of emissions allowances

- How allowances are allocated to covered entities in an ETS determines how the burden of meeting the target is shared across the economy
- The government can distribute allowances through free allocation, auctioning or (most commonly) a combination of the two

ETS creates valuable allowances: **climate rent** ...  
but who gains that value?



## JT elements for ETS: Policy objectives of allocation


- **Manage the transition to an ETS** – some permits have been allocated freely as a means of compensation
- **Carbon leakage concerns** – free allocation can be used to protect industries exposed to external competition
- **Raising revenue** – auctioning can generate significant public revenues
- **Preserving incentives** – the allocation method can have implications for incentives to reduce emissions.

# Auctioning revenues

High carbon prices and new revenue streams in NZ and DE generated record levels of revenues in 2021

In 2021 cumulative auctioning revenues grew by more than 50% year on year, from \$103bn to \$161bn

Revenues are being reinvested to further climate action or assist industry and consumers



# Using auction revenue


Spending depends on the policy objectives of the jurisdiction  
Can **build political support** among the public and other constituencies



## FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO DISADVANTAGED GROUPS

Governments can support low-income households or vulnerable communities to counter rising energy costs and to facilitate the transition to a low-carbon economy.

*RGGI,  
California,  
Québec*



## AUCTION PROCEEDS CAN BE USED IN DIFFERENT WAYS:



## FUND CLIMATE ACTION

Governments can invest in adaptation, renewable or other low-carbon technology, energy efficiency, clean transport, waste and forestry.



## CONTRIBUTION TO THE PUBLIC BUDGET

Governments can use ETS revenue to reduce taxes, finance other policy priorities or to reduce the budget deficit.

*Small %  
RGGI,  
California*

*EU, RGGI,  
California,  
Québec*

# Using allowances for just transition

## Freely allocated allowances

- Preserving **competitiveness** and avoiding **carbon leakage**
- Free allocation handout as **compensation**
- **Important to distinguish between compensation and leakage protection**

## Auctioned allowances

### ‘Pre-auction’ set-aside:

- Allowances allocated to **funds** (for innovation, modernization, social expenditures etc) and are later monetized and disbursed

### ‘Post-auction’ use

- Revenues earmarking and recycling
- Consignment auctions
- Contribution to general budget – tax reform


- Lump-sum payments
- Reduce cost of electricity
- Lowering other taxes
- Energy efficiency investments
- Workforce trainings

- Increasing social transfers
- Subsidies and investments in clean energy and mobility
- Funding innovation... etc etc

## Some examples: EU auctioning revenues

### ➤ Focus on climate funding

- Member States decide how to use their auction revenue
- Min. 50% should go towards climate action
- World's largest programs for low-carbon innovation: the Innovation and Modernization Funds, which finance low-carbon technology innovation, modernization of energy systems and energy efficiency in 10 lower-income MSs)




## Some examples: RGGI auctioning revenues

- RGGI considered a “Cap and invest” program – emphasis on investment
- RGGI states decide how they invest RGGI revenues
- Approx. 80% of proceeds have so far been invested in **consumer benefit programs**




\*a job-year is one year of full-time employment; jobs such as efficiency audit performers, energy efficiency measures installers or trainers on energy issues



## Some examples: California auctioning revenues

- **Most of California's revenue goes to the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund (GGRF)**
  - At least 35% must benefit low-income households or communities
  - Projects that reduce GHG emissions
  - Investments through the GGRF are generated through state-owned allowances and referred to as California Climate Investments.
  - Additional revenue from allowances allocated to utilities but auctioned on their behalf must benefit their ratepayers or reduce emissions.



## Some concluding considerations

- International experience shows: carbon pricing can gain and maintain public support if it **addresses unintended impacts and communicates this effectively**.
- **Visible recycling of carbon revenues** effectively addresses adverse social impacts.
- Altering the basic design of a carbon market to achieve other objectives risks compromising its effectiveness
- Any measures to address the distributive impacts of the policy should be done in a way that **maintains a clear price signal**, to ensure that the carbon price is able to fulfil its intended role in the climate policy mix
- **Complementary policies** can contribute to cushioning social impacts


# ICAP ETS Tools

## ICAP new website and map



## News

Objective coverage on all regulatory ETS developments as they occur




## ETS briefs

Introduction of the basics of cap-and-trade



## Infographics

Visualization of key ETS trends



## Publications

Key reference material on ETS



## Allowance Price Explorer

Historical and current carbon prices worldwide



**Thank you for your attention!**

[Stefano.declara@icapcarbonaction.com](mailto:Stefano.declara@icapcarbonaction.com)

<https://icapcarbonaction.com/>



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